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THE POWEK AND LIMITS QP THE EMERGENCY STATK
"We cannot respond by blind defiance based on the view
that the state is panic-stricken and all that is needed
is a big push. Nor can we respond by saying that the
state's power is unassailable - that it has no
weaknesses, and that we should retreat into total
inaction." - Cosatu discussion paper, Special
Congress, 1988.
This paper is an assessment of the strategies, structures and resources that
the Emergency State has deployed to fight its battles on the "political
terrain" (1). We intend demonstrating that a new set of strategies are being
implemented in response to the failure in the face of mass resistance of the
early "total strategy" reforms. While capital and the popular classes have
pursued in their own ways a range of strategies to transform apartheid, the
state (and the interests that dominate it) has been able to mobilise enormous
resources and coordinate ambitious policies to respond to these challenges*
By 1988, the state had arrived at a point where political reform had ground to
a halt and "crisis management" had become its primary strategic concern, in
the process, state power and executive decision-making became concentrated in
the Office of the State President (OSP) which, in turn, is increasingly
dependent on the National Security Management System (NSMS). Recent analyses
of state institutions have failed to note the extent to which this Office has
become the epicentre of an authoritarian power structure (2) that binds
together in the person of the President the complex security hierarchy, the
state departments and the facade of consociational parliamentary government
(3). The Office of the State President uses as its main instruments of power
the cabinet, cabinet committees, State Security Council and National Security
Management System (NSMS) as mecnanisms for ensuring that the policies of the
Executive President are accepted and implemented.
State policies and actual outcomes rarely coincide. This is because the state
has to do battle on a terrain of ongoing struggles, conflicts and
contradictions generated both by tensions between its own institutions and by
challenges and pressures emanating from without. Any assessment of the
shifting nature of state strategy and the structures it has erected to
implement these strategies must take cognisance of this social context (4).
THE BOTHA STATE AND TOTAL STRATEGY
The highly complex and disorganised decision-making structures of
the ore-Botha state, a 1980 White Paper on Rationalisation
arguea, "makes it difficult for the central executive machinery
to act swiftly and effectively to solve orobi ems and crises" <5>.
By restructuring state decision-making structures, this report
argued, "a more manageable machinery of government to meet new
challenges and crises" could be created (6).
The re-organisation of the state decision-making strucnuros was
one aspect of what became known during the early 1980s as the
"total strategy" programme. Originating in the security
establishment and the "verligte" wing of the NP, this programme
aimed to coordinate and centralise reform policies and security
strategies while streamling and rationalising the bureaucracy.
The reform oolicies of the early 1980s were supoosed to
restructure four basic social arenas* the- workplace, the city, .
the regional oolitical economies and the constitutional order
Six components of the broadly defined executive branches of the
state were re-organised between 1979 and the introduction of the
new Constitution in 19B3i
1) the Department of the Prime Minister was turned into the
Office of the Prime Minister <0PM) and given extended oowers
exercised through its various "planning branches"
responsible for all key aspects of policy making (8)|
2) the National Intelligence Service (NIS) replaced the
Bureau of State Securityi
3> cabinet committees, working groups for cabinet committees and
a cabinet secretariat were introduced (9)|
4) the state departments were re-organised and reduced in number
(10) and a new department, the Deoartment of
Constitutional Development and Planning, was created to
manage the macro-planning of reform policies (11)\
3) the Senate was abolished and a Presidents Council (PC)
established to work out a new constitutional disoensation
(12).
6) the State Security Council was turned into a powerful
policy-making body and the embryo of a complex national,
regional and local system of committees was set up
underneath the SSC - the so-called National Security -
Management System (N8MS) (13) (see diagram)\
The reorganisation of the central decision-making structures
prepared the way -for the highly centralised and constitutionally
sanctioned authoritarianism o-f the Executive Presidency that was
created by th» 1983 Constitution (14).
Proceeding -from the assumption that the state was -faced with a
"total onslaught" aimed at undermining all levels o-f society, the
new PW Botha administration moved swiftly to implement a "total
strategy" with three goals (13)i
* to maintain state security,
* reform the political environment, and -••
* coordinate all state action.
"Total strategy" olanners identified four areas of "reform"* the
legalisation of black trade unions through the Wiehahn •
Commissions the recognition of the oermanence of urban blacks in
line with the recommendations of the Riekert Commission; the
formulation and imolementation of a new constitution that brought
Indians and coloured* into parliament as junior partners; and
the introduction of a new regional development policy to
coordinate industrial development planning in accordance with
de-pollticised regional boundaries rather than racially
determined constitutional divisions. This involved the division
of South Africa into 9 "development" regions for the purpose of
integrated "development planning" (16).
The internal logic of "total strategy" reforms was coherent and
premised on a specific perception of South Africa's social
reality. The Riekert Commission's assumption was that bantustans
could be retained but that, in response to the unrest of
1976-77, "urban blacks" must be recognised as permanent members
of the cities and towns.
Once "urban rights" had been conceded by the Riekert Commission,
then a range of other complementary rights necessarily followed!
rights to form trade unions, purchase property, sail labour on a
"free urban labour market" without a contract, and trade. The
municipal franchise was seen as the ultimate embodiment of the
new "urban identity"?--Blacks were given, for the first time ever,
fully autonomous municipal institutions•- the Black Local •
Authorities - with extensive urban powers (e.g. allocation of
housing and. trading sites). ••
The new urban policy created several critical problems that soon
contributed to black protest. First, because it wanted to create
a priviledged elite* of "urban insiders" divorced -from the poverty
of the rural masses? it required an Intensification of influx
control - hence the> proposed Orderly Movement and Settlement of
Black Persons Bill of 1982.' Second* the Black Local Authorities,
as a form of local political self-government, were designed to
be financially self-sufficient even though they were excluded by
the Group Areas Act from access to rateable commercial and
industrial property. Third, because the BLAs' only link to higher
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•forms of representation was through the bantustans, the issue of
the overall illegitimacy of state constitutional reform was
exacerbated.
The constitutional reforms were premised on the consociational
theory that "group identities" in multi-cultural societies must
be protected but that structures for "co-determination" and
"joint decision-making" must also be created. The result for
whites, coloureds and Indians was the creation of a new
"consociational contract".
As far as the majority African population was concerned, the new
regional development policy rested on the principle of "economic
interdependence and political independence" or what the Buthelezi
Commission called the "soft-borders approach". Bantustans would
proceed to independence and then enter into a supra-state
agreement to form a "confederation of Southern African states".
In summary, "total strategy" may have left many fundamentals of
apartheid intact (e.g. bantustans, influx control and
constitutional exclusion of africans from central government),
but it did introduce significant modifications to some basic
institutions of political society. These institutions regulated
access to three social *renasi the city, the factory and
government. In reality, however, the maximum the white minority
was prepared to concede in the early 1980s fell far short of the
minimum tho black majority was prepared to accept.
In the end "total strategy" failed because ita idealistic
intentions were thwarted by * sustained period of black
resistance. This resistance exacerbated, highlighted and brought
to the fore the key structural contradictions that original
"total strategy" reforms failed to address.
As far as urban policy was concerned, the attempt to drive a
wedge between "urban insiders" and "rural outsiders" by
intensifying influx control was challenged and made unviable by
two social movements. The first and most important was the
squatter struggles. Displaying desperate and relentless
determination to escape grinding rural poverty and live in urban
areas, squatter communities broke through the urban wall and
illegally invaded land to secure their right to urban existence.
The labour movement also helped undo the "rural-urban" divide. By
organising migrant workers and urban proletarians into single
industrial trade union organisations committed to joint wage
demands, the intention to create two entirely separate labour
markets - one urban and priviledged and the other rural and cheap
- was severely undercut.
The local government system that was supposed to bind the new
urban system together was soon in ruins. Because the state
insisted that councils should raise their own finance for
development, councillors were forced to increase rent and service
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charges. Their low levels o-f legitimacy meant neglectinG
development altogether was simply not an option. They needed to
demonstrate the benefits o-f participation. The increases,
however, triggered a nation-wide popular rebellion that began in
the Vaal townships in September 1984 and spread across the
country. By mid-1985 most Black Local Authorities had collapsed
because o-f mass resignations or because councillors had been
killed by residents.
Fiscal unviability was not the only problem. The root cause o-f
the depth of popular protest was the fact that the local
franchise was not tied to a programme for granting full political
rights to blacks. This facilitated the emergence through the
local community organisations of a national political
organisation - the United Democratic Front - commlttad to tha
total dismantling of Apartheid and the creation of a non-racial
democracy (17).
The new labour dispensation failed to achieve its objectives.
When the unions threatened to opppose the legislation because
migrants were excluded from the right to join unions, the state
backed down and extended the definition of "employes" to include
mi grant workers.
The consociational contract foundered on the rocks of popular
resistance expressed through the election boycotts of 1984.
The confederal schema also began to come apart at the seams. The
steady political and fiscal decline of model bantustans like
Ciskei, Transkei and Bophutatswana made it abundantly clear that
separate development and the grand vision of a Confederation of
States was turning into at nightmare.
In short, "total strategy" inadvertently created spaces for the
initiation and deepening of mass democratic mobilisation and
organisation. By granting industrial rights, unions were spawned
that challenged relations in the factories, cities and political
society. Opening up the urban system generated urban movements
that politicised civil society and destroyed the cornerstones of
the Riekert policy framework. And constitutional reform provided
the focus for national organisation and resistance on a scale not
seen since the 1950s. All these manifestations of resistance and
opposition short-circuited key state strategies and prepared the
way for new ones.
Intense struggles were fought within the state during the 1985-86
period over what was to replace the failed policies of "total
strategy". In some ways these struggles reflected the influence
of big business on state policies. These interests responded to
the failure of reform, township unrest, the politicisation of the
workplace and economic recession by pressurising government in
both public and private ways to move beyond the original
parameters of the "total strategy" programme. The campaign
against influx control spearheaded by the Urban Foundation is the
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best example. The public tone of business politics in 1985-86
reflected the urgently -felt need in these quarters for policies
that would de-racialise the capitalist system <18).
In other ways, these struggles also reflected competing
intra-state conceptions of how to protact the generalised
interests of the white minority.
STRUGGLES WITHIN THE STATE
The failure of the "total strategy" reforms immediately created
the need amongst state planners for the formulation of
alternatives. The formulation of alternative policies, however,
did not take place in a vaccuum. It is now generally accepted
that the state is not a unified monolith <i9). Different branches
of the state wera inter—facing with the black communities on
different levels and interpreting the challenges from below in
different ways. To understand state responses to the
contradictory consequences of their own strategies, a picture of
the balance of institutional interests within the state is
required.
At this point the three most important institutional forces
within the state that had a say in the formulation of
alternatives to "total strategy" were the OSP, the Department of
Constitutional Development and Planning <DCDP) and the security
establishment- The DCDP was, until early 1986, the flagship of
reformist policy-making. It was this department that formulated
both the early "total strategy" reform programmes and the 19B5-86
extended reform policies that moved the state well beyond its
initial reform goals. However, the security eetablishment was
also emerging with strategies of its own to defuse the crisis. In
the end, as we will show, it was when the OSP came down
decisively in favour of the security establishment's proposal
that the state defend itself by means of "counter—revolutionary
warfare" methods, that the balance of institutional farces within
the state shifted decisively against the DCDP.
The DCDP was created in 1962 under Minister Heunis. Its
institutional foundations were the "planning branches" that had
been created in the Office of the Prime Minister in 1980. Each
"branch" dealth with a specific field of state action: physical
p1anni ng, economi c pali cy, consti tuti anal development, securi ty
planning, social planning and scientific planning. The transfer
of these branches to the newly created DCDP in 1982 (except for
the security planning branch which became the secretariat for the
SSC), turned it into the engine room of government policy-making
and strategic thinking. It was here that overall
macro-coordination of all the major state reform actions during
the 1962-85 period took place, e.g. the new constitution, the
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restructuring of local government, the new regional development
policies, the population development plan and the urbanisation
strategy (20).
Proceeding -from the assumption that more concessions would
satisfy black demands and legitimise state strategies, the
political reformers in the DCDP responded to black rejection of
reform by extending the reform programme. There were five
critical moments in the extension of this programme!
* in November 1984, Minister Heunis announced that Black Local
Authorities were to be included into the proposed Regional
Services Councils;
* in May 19B5 Stoffel Van Der Merwe published his National Party
pamphlet entitled "... and what about the Blacks?" which argued
that homelands were a failure;
* in September 1985 PW Botha announced that citizenship would be
restored to all afrlcans residing permanently in "South Africa";
* in late 1985 PW Botha conceded that the tri-cameral parliament
was not the final solution* merely a step in a process;
* in September 1985 the Presidents Council published its report
on urbanisation which culminated in the December 19B5 statement
by Heunis that blacks would be given freehold property rights and
in the 1986 Abolition of Influx Control Act,
All these extensions of the reform programme were ad hoc
responses to popular pressure from political movements, business
organisations, the international community, trade unions,
squatters and township organisations and the deepening sense of
crisis. These shifts unintentionally undid existing policy
positions without being coupled to a coherent set of alternatives
(21) .
The extension of the reform programme during this period met with
the strategic requirements of the "counter-insurgency" framework
that was still dominant at the time. In an address to the
Institute of Strategic Studies in 1981, ex-police commissioner
General Johann Coetzee isolated five key elements of the
"counter-insurgency" position (22)i
* "a dynamic policy of change" to "make the RSA a difficult
target to pin down for assault"|
* "a clear political objective ... to ensure a free, independent
and united country";
* "propaganda ... directed at the counterinsurgents, the
population and the insurgent";
* the avoidance of conflict and defusing of "explosive
si tuati ons"; and
* "an effective information organization and spy network".
"Counter—insurgency", he said, "is based on the cornerstone of
information or intelligence." Yet by mid-1986 it seemed to many
in the security establishment - and elsewhere in the state - that
the "dynamic policy o-f change" embodied in the re-formist policies
pursued in the 1978 to 1986 period had -failed to de-fuse
conflict. Decimation of the spy network through attacks on
informers, moreover, had undone the very cornerstone of "counter—
insurgency". To increasingly assertive security hardliners, the
democratic opening which reform previously provided had to be
closed and "countei—insurgency", with its bias toward political
solutions based on good intelligence, replaced with a far more
thorough-going and coordinated programme that would crush the
democratic opposition, "counter-organise" the communities and
upgrade socio-economic conditions.
The National Security Management System (NSMS) is the structure
of unified command which has been activated to co-ordinate the
implementation of this new strategy. Although established
silently in the wings right at the outset of the post-1978 period
(23), the NSMS was not initially fully activated or turned into
the nerve centre of state action that it has now become.
Instead, it was created as a fall back in case the formal
civilian structure collapsed or proved unable to govern the
country on its own. During the heydey of "total strategy" in the
early 1980s the official* who staffed the NSMS, to quote one
former state official, "were just keeping the seats warm." (24)
The turning point came in May 1986 when PW Both* and the generals
decided to scuttle the EPS Mission's proposals by bombing three
capitals of the front-line states. Instead of negotiating with
the black opposition <as Chris Heunis's department was beginning
to do at the local level), the state moved to smash it by
declaring a National State of Emergency and activating the NSMS
at all levels. In the words of one ex-security policeman, "when
the moment came, all we needed to do was to hit the switch" (25).
"Hitting the switch" meant turning the NSMS shell into a crisis
management machine. As will be shown below, the pre-1986
organisation of the NSMS was, in the words of a reliable
pro-government intelligence source, "found to be lacking as far
as proper communication and control channels were concerned,
apart from the fact that it was designed for a totally different
function and was not geared for the day-to-day running of the
Emergency" (26). The NSMS was "structured as a separate arm of
government" (27) under the auspices, direction and effective
control of the OSP. Before discussing the specific operation of
and strategies implemented by the NSMS, an analysis of the
structure of the OSP is required.
OFFICE OF THE STATE PRESIDENT
The OSP has become the epicentre of state power (28). No major
macro-policy decision is taken without the President's personal
approval or direct involvement in its formulation. US political
scientist Samuel Huntington's 1981 proposition in Politikon that
the "route -from a limited uni-racial democracy to a broader
multi-racial democracy could run through some -form of autocracy"
(29) has become an accurate re-flection o-f how centralised
executive power has become. The OSP has managed to achieve this
by subordinating key executive structures to itselff taking
direct control of some executive powers and then rooting itself
in the "crisis management" functions of the NSMS. This is the
best method, Deputy Minister Leon Wessels argued, of dealing
with "the question of political power" because "one of the most
important principles of counter-revolutionary action is that
unity of purpose within the framework of a co-ordinated plan is
essential." <30) This view was echoed in a Department of
Military Intelligence booklet which concluded its analysis of
"counter-revolution" with a quote from one-time commanding
officer of British forces in Malaya:
"Any idea that the business of normal government and
the business of the Emergency are two separate entities
must be killed for good and all. The two activities are
completely and utterly inter-related." (31)
The OSP consists of a number of committees, advisors,
secretariats and Ministries that deal with public
administration, public expenditure priorities, constitutional
affairs, economic policy, socio-economic development ("welfare"),
propaganda and national security. The most important of these are
the President's immediate advisors, the National Priorities
Committee,, Commission for Administration, Information Ministry,
National intelligence Service <NIS), Welfare Secretariat,
Economic Advicory Council (EAO and the National Joint Management
Centre (NJMC).
The Director-General of the OSP, Jannie Roux, and other close
advisors employed by the OSP are significant because access to
the President is channelled through them. They have a say on who
reaches the President and on what information he acts.
The Welfare Secretariat, that is now directly controlled by the
staff of the OSP, emerged out of changes to the cabinet committee
system. The three cabinet committees for constitutional, social
and economic matters initially comprised the relevant Ministers
and senior state officials. Each committee had a working group
comprising the officials on the cabinet committees. Since 1986,
the officials have been squeezed out of the cabinet committees
and a welfare secretariat controlled directly by Jannie Roux has
been created to administer the functioning of the "welfare"
cabinet committees. This has placed the macro-coordination of
non-security policy in the hands of a secretariat that is
directly controlled by the OSP. The cabinet is merely the
political structure that is supposed to legitimise this
decision-making process.
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Up until 1986, the OSP coordinated the activities of the welfare
departments and the security establishment via the National
Coordinating Committee <NCC). After the declaration of the State
of Emergency, this overall coordinating function was transferred
to the newly activated NJMC that fell directly within the NSMS.
When the NCC coordinated welfare and security functions, the OSP
was probably using it simply to facilitate liason between the two
arms of the state. However, when the NJMC took over this role,
coordinating these two arms became a critical component of the
"crisis management" system. It also meant that the OSP became
more directly involved in the day-to-day management of the
Emergency state and it did so by rooting itself in the NSMS.
The National Priorities Committee, originally established in 1984
to oversee the design of the Budgtft, has taken ovir economic
policy-making functions that were previously the responsibility
of the Department of Finance, EAC and the Central Economic
Advisory Service. The National Priorities Committees makes all
the kay decisions about how the state spends public money in the
context of sanctions and deepening recession. In particular, it
is this committee that balances the competing but complementary
demands of defence and socio-economic upgrading.
The Commission for Administration (CFA) is an extremely powerful
tool answerable to the President. Its 1000 employees design
organisational plans to ensure the effective implementation of
executive decisions. The CFA is entitled to issue orders that
Ministers and Directors-General are obliged to carry out.
Although it handled 211 investigations into bureaucratic
restructuring in 1987 alone, its major task at the moment is to
execute the privatisation programme. The CFA falls under the
Minister in the OSP entrusted with Administration and
Privatisation.
The NIS, with its 3000 employees under Director-General Neil
Barnard, is responsible for intelligence interpretation and
evaluation. The OSP relies heavily on the NIS for assessments and
analysis of security-related issues and for the formulation of
counter-strategies.
The Ministry for Information in the OSP under Minister Stoffel
Van Der Merwe regulates and controls the communication activities
of all governments. The Bureau for Information is involved at all
levels in what one official called the "war of words" - an
essential component of the "counter-revolutionary" strategy. The
Bureau's involvement in the Communication Committees of the JMCs
links the OSP directly to grassroots propaganda efforts. The
Bureau claims that its publications, including 45 township
newspapers, have a readership of 2,5 million people.
Although the OSP has always been central to the new
constitutional system, during 1987-BB its power and significance
became more pronounced. This was particularly apparant in thB way
the President unilaterally reconstituted the EAC in mid-1986.
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Prior to 1986, the EAC was the most important institutional link
between organised business interests and the state. It included
representatives o-f business organisations, academics, top
officials and cabinet ministers and it was chaired by Dr. Simon
Brand o-f the Development Bank. In mid-1986 PW Botha announced
that most o-f the o-f-ficials and academics were to be excluded -from
the EAC and that from then on he would personally appoint the
business representatives. Those who have been appointed are the
leading lights o-f monopoly capital.
In business circles, there are different interpretations of the
changes in the EAC. While some see it as evidence of a deepening
alliance between big business and the state, a more widely held
view is that the changes have resulted in a downgrading of the
influence of organised capitalist interests. As far as the state
is concerned, the EAC is one of a number o-f forums where it would
like to consolidate an alliance with monopoly capital around
common interests in deregulation, privatisation, sanctions
busting, urban development and economic reform in general. (The
other forums include, for example, the Joint Liason Forums,
Panel of Business Leaders attached to the CFA, the Secretariat
for Unconventional Trade, Defense Manpower Liason Committees and
occasional business summits.) This is part of the state's view
that business has a responsibility to play a leading role in the
economic and welfare components of the "counter-revolutionary"
effort while leaving security and constitutional matters to the
state.
In short, the OSP has emerged as the lynchpin of key strategic
thinking and action. The coordination of all the policy functions
outlined above falls directly under its control and purview. By
1988 this office and its incumbent had become the most decisive
decision-maker in the state - a level of power centralisation not
uncommon in societies going through a violent interregnum.
11
 COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE "
The implementation of the "counter-revolutionary warfare"
strategies through the NBMS has involved four significant
changesi
(a) the establishment of a new structure of centralised command
under the direct purview of the OSP, i.e. the NJMC;
(b) the deployment of new security personnel in key positions in
the system (Africa Confidential. 10.11.1986, 8.7.1987, 10.6.1987,
17.6.1988).
(c) a vast increase in the numbers of people drawn into the
system at JMC, sub-JMC and mini-JMC level <32); and
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(d) the imposition of a new theory of state action, i.e.
"counter—revolutionary warfare" in order to
"win-hearts-and-minds" ("WHAM") (Africa Confidential. 17.6.19B8)
(33).
The "counter-revolutionary warfare" position replaced the
"counter—insurgency" ("COIN") perspective that former security
police chief General Johan Coetzee propounded in the early 1980s.
"Counter—insurgency" was seen to have no answer to the
unprecedented scale of the 19B4 to 1986 uprising, or to the
powerful local and international pressures for fundamental
change. By mid-19B6, the hardliners' advocacy of an alternative
strategy designed to break the apposition and rebuild support
bases for the state enabled them to force the scuttling of the
EPG Mission in May 1936 and the declaration of a permanent
national state of emergency.
Unlike "counter-insurgency", which concentrated on intelligence
gathering while leaving politics to the civilians, "counter-
revolutionary war" involved the security establishment in
countering the revolutionary strategy at 9^/ary point. It
relegated the politics of reform to a matter of at best secondary
importance, to be dealt with at some point in the future. The
immediate task was to secure the security of the statei or as the
DMI booklet put its "To defeat the revolutionaries and ... regain
the initiative." (34)
The new "countBr—revolutionary" strategists - the so-called
"securocrats" - proceeded from three basic points of departure
(35) n
* first, law and order must be restored before reforms can be
introduced)
* second, socio-economic development or what PW Botha called
"social reform" must precede political reform (36)|
* third, constitutional development must begin at local level and
proceed upwards to higher levels.
"Re-establishing law and order" involved the declaration of what
has effectively become a permanent State of Emergency and the
detention of around 30 000 people, the banning of 34
organisations, widespread vigilantism and the silencing of
leaders and alternative newspapers (37).
A large-scale socio-economic upgrading programme has been
launched in the most troublesome black townships. Thirty-four of
the most volatile townships - the so-called "oilspots" - have
been earmarked for special attention (38). About 1800 urban
renewal projects are currently in progress (39) in approximately
200 townships countrywide. R300 million will be spent by the
thirteen TVL RSCs (40). Official sources have claimed that R34
billion will have to be spent on housing development over the
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next twenty years (41). PW Botha criticised sanctions on the
grounds that it would deprive black townships o-f R9,5 billion -for
socio-economic upgrading over the next ten to -fi-fteen years (42),
The Department of Development Planning spent R59 million on
upgrading during 1986/87 and R57 million was budgetted -for
19B7/88. The Development Bank spent R2,4 billion on services and
housing during 1984-7. Budgets for the three model "oilspots" are
Crossroads - R90 million, Alexandra - R95, Mamelodi - R410
million (including housing) (43). Unfortunately, no precise total
expenditure figures for the upgrading programme as a whole have
been given by the authorities.
The sources of funding for thifl urban development programme
include the Development Bank, Regional Services Councils,
Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, Provincial
Administrations, South African Development Trust, South African
Housing Trust, Urban Foundation, private sector companies,
Department of Finance and local authorities. Reliable sources
have confirmed that special funding for upgrading is also being
channelled through South African Defence Force budgets. The
Deputy-Governer of the Reserve Bank, Jan Lombard, estimated in
198B that R4,5 billion per annum is needed until the year 2000 to
finance a large-scale "settlement programme" for blacks. This, he
argued, was R3,3 billion more than the Rl,2 billion currently
invested in this area by the public and private sectors (44).
As far as political reform is concerned, the logic of th*
"counter—revolutionary warfare" strategy implies that only once
security actions have run their course, grievances addressed and
municipal government restored, that political reform will again
become an issue on the agenda.
The "counter—revolutionists" argued that to be successful the
security-upgrade strategy had to fall under centralised command
and be tightly coordinated. Their chosen instrument was the
NSMS. The most decisive institutional expression of their new
ascendancy in the state was the establishment and activation of
the National Joint Management Centre (NJMC) in the heart of the
NSMS (see diagram). Through the NJMC, the security establishment
was entrusted for the first time with the coordination of both
security and welfare decision making functions.
The NJMC is chaired by deputy minister of law and order, Leon
Wessels, and is responsible for the daily management of the State
of Emergency. Its headquarters are located in Tuynhuis. Under the
direct guidance of the OSP, the NJMC coordinates state action at
all levels. The NJMC has a "Nationale Staatkundiges Ekonomiese
end Maatskaplike Komittee" ("SEMKOM") to coordinate welfare
policy and a "Gesamentlike Sekuriteits Kommittee" to coordinate
security strategies.
The State Security Council (SSC) is at the apex of the NSMS. It
brings together the most important of the cabinet ministers and
the country's security chiefs. Its regular members are the state
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president (the chairman)j the minister of de-fences the ministers
and directors-general of the departments of law and order,
foreign affairs, finance, constitutional development and
justice; and a few politically important cabinet ministers such
as FW De Klerk. The SSC is a macro-policy making body and not in
direct daily control of Emergency management. As the previous
section suggested, the OSP is more important than the SSC when it
comes to the running of the NSMS.
The security officials on the SSC Are the chief of the SADF
(General Jannie Geldenhuys) and the chiefs of the army
(Lt-General Kat Liebenberg), navy (Vice-Admiral Glyn
Syndercombe), airforce (Lt-General Jan van Loggerenberg) and
medical services (Lt-General Daniel Knobel)5 the directors of the
National Intelligence Service and of military intelligence (Neil
Barnard and Lt-General CJ van Tonder)| the commissioner of
police, Major—General Hennie de Witt and the chief of the
security police. Major—General Johann van der Merwej the director
of security legislation, Andre Bosch, and the director-general of
the state president's office, Or Jannie Roux (Africa Confident-
B.7.87). Of the 23 permanent members of the SSC other than the
state president, twelve are security officials. The SSC is also
able to co-opt onto itself for the purpose of specific
discussions any other cabinet minister, senior civil servant or
even industrialists such as the chairman of Armscor. It meets
fortnightly, on a Monday night, the night before cabinet, which
meets on a Tuesday. It assesses, from a security perspective,
all executive decisions of state and decides on matters as
fundamental as the Angola-Namibia peace settlement and the
"invasion" of Bophuthatswana - a "foreign country" - to rescue
its president from a coup bid.
The SSC is backed up by the four legs of the NSMS. The Work
Committee, which provides expert backup to the SSC, consists of
the heads of government departments represented on the SSC and
the heads of the other three cabinet committees (the committees
for social, economic and constitutional affairs, now subsumed
under the welfare secretariate). Support to the Work Committee
and the SSC is given by the secretariat of the SSC, The
personnel of the secretariat are drawn from the following
departmentsi SADF - 70'/., NIS - 20'/. and Foreign Affairs -10'/.
(45). It is reponsible for intelligence interpretation, strategic
communication, Btrategy formulation and administration of the
security management system. In addition, there are thirteen
inter—departmental committees that have been created to ensure
the coordination of departmental resources and activities.
As the definition of security has broadened to include the
management of most conceivable problems and processes, so the
official designation of the system itself is beginning to change
to simply the National Management System (46). This suggests that
the NSMS is no longer regarded as simply a temporary measure, but
that this "structure could become a permanent feature of
government" (47).
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The real lifeblood of the NSMS is its -fourth leg - the network
o-f aver 500 regional, district and local Joint Management
Centres (JMCs) . The NJMC coordinates the activities o-f both the
Mel-Fare and security secretariats above it, while attempting to
ensure the smooth functioning of the hundreds of committees below
it. The latter include:
* eleven JMCs which divide the country into management regions
corresponding to SADF area commands and, roughly, to the nine
economic development regionsj
* sixty odd sub-JMCs, with some having borders that correspond
to the Regional Services Councils; and
* at the local level somewhere between 250 and 500 mini-JMCs and
Local Management Centres which co-ordinate state action in almost
every settled community in th«.country.
These co-ordinating structures bring together military, police
and civilian officials, usually under tho chairmanship of a
senior military or police officer. The function* of a JMC and
the essence of the "counter—revolutionary warfare" strategy are
apparent in each JMCs committee structure. Although there are
frequently local variations in their precise makeup most, whether
they are the NJMC, regional JMCs or local mini-JMCs, have four
functional committees and a coordinating executive with
representatives of ««ch on it. These four committees are the
intelligence committee, the security committee, the welfare
committee and the communications committee. In many ways, the
functions of these committees mirror the concentration of power
at the highest level in the OSP, which centralizes a similar set
of functions! coordination, intelligence, security, welfare and
communications (see diagram 2).
Each intelligence committee gathers and interprets the
intelligence an which co-ordinated state activities are based.
Staffed by representatives of military intelligence, the security
police and the National Intelligence Service, it seeks to promote
unity of effort between these traditionally competing
intelligence agencies. The security committee, the repressive
arm of the NSMS, acts on the intelligence provided by the
intelligence committee. Staffed by a combination of riot police
officers, military officers, security branch officers and
officers of the municipal police, of the kitskonstabels, and of
commando and civil defence units, it coordinates the
implementation of security strategies laid down by the SSC.
The welfare committee, on the other hand, takes responsibility
for co-ordinating the functions of the civilian administration.
Though at the national level this includes the coordination of,
for example, constitutional and labour issues, at most levels
welfare implies a particular concern with local upgrade
programmes- Its membership consists of officials of the various
non-security state departments, eg roads, education, welfare,
health, constitutional development, transport services, the
Provinces' community services offices, etc. More than anything
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else the welfare committee tries to prioritize development
projects, cut red tape* unblock bottlenecks and generally ensure
that things get done.
The -functions of the security committee and the welfare
committee - the two essential arms o-f the system - encapsulate
the overall intentions of state security »trategists. These are,
to use the words of Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlokp to "take
out", "eliminate" or "annihilate" activists on the one hand,
while on the other "addressing grievances." <48)
The overall national security management strategy is sold to the
public via the -fourth o-f the JMC's committees, the communication
committee (Komkom). The KomKoms arB run by the Bureau for
Information, though SADF communications operations (comops)
personnel and public relations personnel from other government
departments do play some role. There is sometimes a clear
overlap of personnel between SADF and Bureau officials. The
Bureau's national head of planning and research, far example, is
a senior military intelligence officer Major-General PJ
Groenewald (Africa Confidential. 8.7.1987).
Komkom attempts to do three things. Firstly, through the co-
ordination of lectures, television programmes, pamphlets,
newspaper articles and the publication of local newspapers it
aims to explain and justify action taken against activists and
opposition organizations. Secondly, Komkom aims to ensure the
maximum publicity for welfare type projects and government
supporting "counter-organizations". Wherever possible credit for
JMC co-ordinated programmes will be taken by "civil bodies" such
as Black Local Authorities. At the same time the sincerity of
state reforms is widely publicised both inside and outside the
country. The third apparent function of the Komkoms is the
co-ordination of disinformation via a variety of media forms,
pamphlets and township graffiti (49).
The JMC system interfaces with the public informally through
talks and lectures on the nature of the counter—revolutionary war
given by JMC officials. The head of the »tr*tegic communication
branch of the SSC secretariat once claimed to have given "about a
thousand lectures" on the system in a six year period (Worsnip,
1988s98). A more formal relationship between the public, the
business community and the security system is being formed
through a network of Joint Liaison Forums, Joint Liaison
Committees and Defence Manpower Liaison Committees (Demalcoms).
These allow the security establishment to market their strategies
to influential members of the public and to broaden their
informal sources of information and support (50).
The secretariat of the SSC is the only part of the NSMS which
employs full time staff. This in fact is one of the major
strengths of the system. At all other levels it relies
exclusively on officials co-opted from the various state
departments themselves. This means that decisions and
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recommendations of the NSMS at all levels ar« the decisions and
recommendations o-f senior officials of these departments;, rather
than being policy imposed from the outside. Just as it is highly
unlikely that the cabinet will override the carefully considered
and security assessed decisions of the SSC, so it is equally
difficult for any single government department to ignore plans
formulated in the JMCs-
CONCLUSION
This paper has tried to trace the evolution of the structures and
strategies of what we have called the Emergency state. Its
responses to pressures within the white power bloc and challenges
from below in the black communities have been twofold: firstly,
it has changed strategic tack in search of new solutions? and
secondly, it has adapted its power structures to manage and
coordinate resources under emergency conditions. In the process,
an authoritarian decision-making structure emerged with the State
President at its epicentre and the security system operating as
its most important executive arm.
The "total strategy" package was adopted in the early 1980s
because it was both a set of means and a coherent conception of
ends. The ends comprised a grand reformist vision of a stable
multi-ethnic society coupled to a set of means that believed that
reform could be managed from above by carefully deploying the
finely honed instrument© of state power. In the end, "total
strategy" failed because the state proceeded from the assumption
that it was neutral and above social conflict and could,
therefore, define solutions as if the apartheid state form
itself was not the cause of the problem.
The explosion of mass resistance from 19B4 onwards not only led
to the collapse of the pre-1984 reform policies, but directly
challenged the apartheid state form itself. It was in direct
response to this threat that the State of Emergency was declared
and the "counter—revolutionary warfare" strategies implemented.
The point is, however, that these strategies are largely reactive
means designed to defend state power. It is now openly admitted
by the state that short of "surrender", it has no coherent
conception of a blueprint or vision of how the fundamental
political conflict can be resolved. Despite Law and Order
Minister Vlok's claim at the Natal NP Congress in 1988 that the
state has a coherent "masterplan" for resolving this conflict
(The Star. 19.9.1988), the Emergency state and its structures is
involved in little more than the business of long-term "crisis
management".
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Although the strategies of the Emergency state are having
profound social and political effects, the outcomes of state
actions do not correspond to the intentions of policy-makers.
Vlok's "masterplan" will more than likely founder on the rocks
of racial oppression, limited resources and ongoing resistance.
The official position of the National Party government remains
the insistance that, in PW Botha's words, "as far as I am
concerned, I am not considering even to discuss the possibility
of black majority government in South Africa." (51) Preventing
this outcome remains, in essence, the purpose of
"cauntet^—revolution" in South Africa. Yet in at least three
instances elsewhere in the world where "counter-revolutionary
warfare" strategies have been used to counter essentially
national struggles (i.e. Vietnam, Algeria and Malaya), in the end
the basic demands of nationalism had to be met. In South Africa,
the complete absence of any constitutional resolution to the
"national question" will guarantee ongoing mass resistance to
white minority rule.
Furthermore, at a time when the Emergency state needs to finance
rising security expenditure and the expensive
"winning-hearts-and-minds" programme, therB arm increasing
constraints on the national resource base. Sanctions, economic
recession, political unrest and declining investment will
exacerbate this structural limitation on the scope of state
action. There is no evidence that the economy will achieve the
5-77. growth rate that Reserve Bank Deputy-Governer Jan Lombard
recently argued is required to finance the socio-economic
upgrading programmes (52).
Finally, the survival of mass opposition in the communities,
schools and workplaces during the Emergency era calls into
question the confident claims by security officials that the
State of Emergency has succeeded in "eliminating the
revolutionaries". Even they concede that there is "still a
revolutionary climate".
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